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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution vested Congress with the authority to establish laws on
bankruptcy.1 With the passage of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Congress revamped and
restructured the bankruptcy laws. Through enacting the Code, Congress
sought to balance
3
the rights of the debtor, its creditors, and other parties in interest.
Congress used the theory of "adequate protection"4 for the secured creditors' interests.
The legislative history explains congressional intent as follows:

* Partner, Young, Scanlon and Sessums, P.A. The author appreciates the assistance of Jeff D. Rawlings and the research assistance of J. Randall Patterson, a student at Mississippi College School of Law, in preparing this article.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has power "[tio establish .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
thmughout the United States.").
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter Code].
3. H.R. REP.No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296.
4. "Adequate protection" is not defined in the Code, although three methods of providing adequate protection are described
in II U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
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[T]he concept of adequate protection is based on as much policy grounds as on constitutional
grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. . . Though
the creditor might not receive his bargain inkind, the purpose of [adequate protection] 5 . . . is
to ensure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for.
The Code contains three policies concerning secured creditors:
1. The secured creditor is entitled to the collateral or its full value.

2. For the benefit of the debtor and other creditors, the secured creditor must wait for a
reasonable time to realize upon its collateral.
3. Because of this waiting period, the secured creditor is entitled adequate protection.6
If the Chapter 11 reorganization is successful, the secured creditor receives the value of
the collateral under the plan of reorganization, which supersedes the creditor's prior rights
under its loan documents. If, however, the reorganization fails, as is usually the case, the
secured creditor receives the collateral or its value.
A simple hypothetical case illustrates the effect of filing a Chapter 11 petition. Suppose
Apartments, Inc. owns a multi-unit apartment complex with a fair market value of
$4,000,000. First Mortgage Corp. holds a $5,000,000 promissory note from Apartments, secured by a perfected first deed of trust on the apartments and real property and a
perfected first security interest in the rents due from Apartments' tenants. If Apartments
defaults, First Mortgage has a number of contractual and state law remedies, including suit
on the promissory note, foreclosure of the deed of trust, and notification to Apartments'
tenants to pay rent to First Mortgage. If First Mortgage's properly conducted foreclosure
sale of the realty fails to bring sufficient sales proceeds to pay the indebtedness, First Mortgage can sue for the deficiency, costs, and fees.
Apartments can prevent a foreclosure by filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Code.
Under the "automatic stay" provision of the Code, the petition operates as an injunction
against the world and prohibits any action to collect a debt or to enforce a security interest
or other lien. 7 The purpose of the stay is to give the business a breathing spell and time to
work constructively with its creditors. 8 The automatic stay also protects creditors by preventing other creditors from obtaining preferential treatment by quick action. 9
Without the automatic stay, on default First Mortgage would have foreclosed its deed of
trust, received the sales proceeds, and had use of those proceeds (and theoretically received interest on them) from the date of bankruptcy. The effect of the stay, therefore, is to
cause the undersecured10 creditor (i.e., collateral value is less than debt) to lose this hypothetical interest on the obtainable foreclosure sales proceeds during the stay period. This
has been called the undersecured creditor's "lost opportunity costs."1"

5963, 6295-96.
& ADMIN. NEWS
5. H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
441 (3d ed. 1985).
6. L. LoPucKI, STRATEGIES FORCREDITORSIN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODECONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296.

9. Id.
10. "Undersecured creditor" is not used or defined in the Code, which refers to a "creditor secured by a lien." II U.S.C. §
506(a) (1988).
11. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 901 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United Savings Association of
Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. ,12decided January 20, 1988, courts

were divided on the undersecured creditor's right to these lost opportunity costs. 13 The
Supreme Court resolved these conflicts in Timbers, holding that an undersecured creditor
was not entitled to compensation for the delay caused by the automatic stay in foreclosing
on its collateral.
In view of Timbers, what strategies should a secured creditor use in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to protect its interests?
II. THE CODE
Under Code subsection 506(a), an undersecured creditor's claim is divided into two
parts: (1) a secured claim equal to the value of the collateral on the date of filing and (2) an
undersecured claim for the difference between the debt and the collateral value. 14 In the
hypothetical situation, First Mortgage holds a secured claim for $4,000,000 i s and an undersecured claim for $1,000,000.
As noted, the automatic stay provision prevents the secured creditor from undertaking
or continuing collection actions, from taking possession of the collateral, and from taking
any action to enforce a lien against the collateral. 16 The bankruptcy court is the only source
of relief for the secured creditor. The bankruptcy court can terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the stay under Code subsection 362(d) which provides:
On request ofa party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from
the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such
party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section,
if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

17

A Chapter 11 debtor 18 may use, sell, or lease its property in the ordinary course of business without prior approval of the bankruptcy court or the secured creditor.1 " But "cash
collateral, 2 ° such as cash, deposit accounts, negotiable instruments, securities, and other

12. 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Mr. Justice Scalia wrote for
a unanimous Court.).
13. Cases allowing were Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985), and Crocker Nat'l Bank
v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In reAmerican Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). Cases denying included
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). One
circuit took a case-by-case view in Lendlease, a Div. of Nat'l
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp.
Co.), 780 F2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
14. 11U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
15. Assume this as the amount of First Mortgage's allowed secured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). An allowed secured
claim can be changed by the secured creditor taking the election granted by II U.S.C. § Ill l(b)(2) (1988), which isbeyond the
scope of this article. See5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1111.02 at 1111-25 (15th ed. 1990).
16. 11U.S.C.§362(a) (1988).
17.11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
18. In this article "debtor' includes the Chapter II debtor-in-possession and any trustee for the debtor. See II U.S.C. §§
1101(l),
1106 (1988).
19. 11U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
20. 11U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
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cash equivalents, is treated differently by the Code. If the secured creditor's collateral is
"cash collateral," the debtor may not use, sell, or lease the collateral unless each secured
creditor consents or the bankruptcy court authorizes the debtor's actions. 2' The bankruptcy court may at any time prohibit or condition22 such use, sale, or lease "as is necessary
to provide adequate protection of such interest."
'The Code gives three illustrations of adequate protection:
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such entity, to
the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of
this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in value of
such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such an entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay,
use, sale, lease or grant results ina decrease inthe value of such entity's interest insuch property; or
by such entity of the indubita(3) granting such other relief. . as will result inthe realization
23
ble equivalent of such entity's interest in such property.
These three illustrations are not the exclusive methods; many other forms of adequate
protection have been used.
The Code provisions require the courts to balance the secured creditor's right to enforce
a contract bargain with the debtor's right to reorganize. 24 What adequate protection, if
any, should the undersecured creditor receive during the reorganization period? Timbers
provides the answer.
III. United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood ForestAssociates, Ltd.
In Timbers the collateral was an apartment complex appreciating slightly in value, but
worth less than the debt to the secured creditor. 25 The creditor was, therefore, undersecured. Even though the debtor agreed to pay the creditor post-petition rents from the
apartments, less operating expenses, the creditor also wanted compensation for the delay
26
caused by the automatic stay in foreclosing on the collateral (i.e., lost opportunity costs).
The creditor moved for relief from the automatic stay under subsection 363(d)(1), 27 alleging a lack of adequate protection for its interest. The issue for decision was "whether
undersecured creditors are entitled to compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) for the
delay caused by the automatic stay in foreclosing on their collateral. "28 A unanimous
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 29
and held that:

21. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988).
22. 11U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 361(l)-(3) (1988).
24. United Va. Bank v. slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191(4th Cir. 1986) ("an appropriate
balance between the rights of the secured creditors and the rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code").
25. United Sav. Ass'nofTex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 793
Cir. 1987), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
F.2d 1380, 1383 (5th Cir. 1986), affd, 808 F.2d 363 (5th
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 369 (1988).
29. United Sav. Ass'n ofTex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808
793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), affg,
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1."[T]he undersecured [creditor] is not entitled to interest on its collateral during the stay
30
to assure adequate protection under II U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)."
2. "Since this provision [section 506(b)] permits postpetition interest to be paid only out of
the 'security cushion,' the undersecured creditor, who has no such cushion, falls within the
31
general rule disallowing postpetition interest."
3. "[I]f the apartment project in this case had been declining in value petitioner would have
been entitled, under § 362(d)(1), to cash payments or additional security in the amount of the
32
decline, as § 361 describes."
4. "Once the movant under § 362(d)(2) establishes that he is an undersecured creditor, it is
the burden of the debtor to establish that the collateral at issue is 'necessary to an effective reorganization.' "33
5. "What this requires is not merely a showing that if there is conceivably to be an effective
reorganization, this property will be needed for it; but the property is essential to an effective
reorganization that is in prospect. This means. . . there must be 'a reasonable possibility of a
successful reorganization within a reasonable time.' "34
6. "[W]hile the bankruptcy courts demand less detailed showings during the four months
in which the debtor is given the exclusive right to put together a plan, see 11 U.S.C. §§
1121 (b), (c)(2), even within that period lack of any realistic prospect of an effective reorgani' 35
zation will require § 362(d)(2) relief."
In summary, Timbers requires adequate protection when the collateral's value is declining, denies adequate protection to the undersecured creditor with stable value, and directs
the bankruptcy courts to scrutinize the proceeding to see if an effective reorganization is in
prospect within a reasonable time.
Three factors should narrow the Timbers'holding: (1) the secured creditor relied solely
on the lack of adequate protection under subsection 362(d)(1); (2) the secured creditor did
not request relief under subsection 362(d)(2); and (3) neither party offered evidence on the
likelihood of a successful reorganization. For these reasons some courts view as dicta the
discussion of subsection 362(d)(2) in the opinion. 36
Since the Timbers opinion, courts have applied the decision both retroactively 37 and
prospectively. 38 If applied retroactively to earlier final orders in pending bankruptcy cases
a debtor could recover from the undersecured creditor the "lost opportunity" adequate protection payments made during the Chapter 11 proceeding or could have those payments
applied to reduce the principal of the secured portion of the undersecured creditor's claim.

30. 484 U.S. at 382.
31. Id. at 372-73.
32. Id. at 370.
33. Id. at 375 (quoting II U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988)).
34. Id. at 375-76 (quoting Timbers, 808 F.2d at 370-71 & nn. 12-13).
35. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 376.
36. E.g., In re Rassier, 85 Bankr. 524, 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), in which the court stated:
In holding that the debtor need not show areasonable likelihood of reorganization under § 362(d)(2)(B), I am mindful of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in [Timbersl ....
The language in Timbers, however, is not controlling in
this case. The issue before the Court was "whether undersecured creditors are entitled to compensation under II U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1) for the delay caused by the automatic stay in foreclosing on their collateral." [Timbers at 369]. Any discussion of§ 362(d)(2) is dictum.
Id.
37. Cimarron Investors v. WYID Properties (In re Cimarron Investors), 848 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. In re Martin, 92 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.1988); In re Rivers, 89 Bankr. 1006 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
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Retroactive application might also permit bankruptcy courts to modify final and agreed
adequate protection orders.3 9 Since the Timbers opinion does not speak to this issue, some
courts hold that the decision should be applied only prospectively.
In re Sherwood Square Associates40 examined the retroactive standards established by
the Supreme Court 41 and stated:
Since the Supreme Court in the Timbers case, effectively overruled the Grundy decision
which had been the controlling law inthis Circuit, the question arises whether the holding in
relief in this case. This Court conTimbers should be applied retroactively to provide Debtor
42
cludes Timbers should not be applied retroactively.
IV. UNDERSECURED CREDITORS' STRATEGIES
A. General
The adequate protection provisions of the Code are not self-executing; the creditor
must ask for relief.43 The secured creditor requests relief from the automatic stay by filing
a motion for relief from the stay, for adequate protection, or to prohibit or condition the
debtor's use of the collateral. The debtor, not the bankruptcy court, has the duty to propose
adequate protection to the creditor.44
B. Negotiation with Debtor
A Chapter 11 debtor has three methods of dealing with the secured creditor. First, the
debtor can negotiate with the secured creditor to settle disputes about adequate protection,
the value of the secured creditor's collateral, the creditor's attorneys' fees and other expenses, the treatment of the secured creditor's claim in the debtor's plan, and many other
matters. Chapter 11 was written with a purpose of motivating the parties to resolve their
disputes through negotiation. 45 Undersecured creditors have incentive to settle because
they do not receive interest payments during the stay period.
The debtor is granted a four-month exclusive period to file a plan of reorganization. 4"
Often, this exclusive period is wasted in court fights with secured creditors on motions
seeking relief from the stay. By settlement the debtor can reduce its costs and work toward
a plan of reorganization acceptable to its creditors.
Second, the debtor can pay the secured creditor all delinquencies, arrearages, and damages suffered because of the debtor's default. The secured creditor is then deemed "unimpaired"47 for the purpose of confirming the plan. While this alternative may not work in a
large single-asset case, debtors can use this method to retain specific items of equipment.

39. BANKR. R. 9024 concerns relief from judgments or orders.
40. Fairfax Sav. v. Sherwood Square Assocs. (In re Sherwood Square Assocs.), 87 Bankr. 388 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988).
41. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
42. In re Sherwood Square Assocs., 87 Bankr. at 392.
43. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Shriver (In re Shriver), 33 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
44. Travelers Ins. Co. v. American AG Credit Corp. (In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co.), 859 F.2d137, 139 (10th Cir. 1988).
45. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 224, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODECoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6183.
46. I1 U.S.C. § 1121(b)-(c) (1988).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1988).
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Third, the debtor can try to force the non-consenting secured creditor to take the plan
under the "cram-down" provisions.48 The cram-down provisions require difficult compliance with many stringent requirements. In the usual case cram-down is not a viable alternative for the debtor.49
As part of the negotiations, the debtor may deliver the collateral to the secured creditor.
If the collateral is a burden to the estate, the debtor may voluntarily abandon the property to
the secured creditor.50 In such case the parties should file a motion for abandonment and to
lift stay, give notice, and obtain an order of the bankruptcy court.
Although the stay prevents the creditor's collection efforts, it does not prevent voluntary
payments by the debtor to a secured creditor. 5 ' But such voluntary payments may be recoverable by the debtor or its trustee from the secured creditor as post-petition preferences. 5 The secured creditor should obtain an order from the bankruptcy court
authorizing these payments as adequate protection. 5 3 The order should specify the
amounts, times of payments, and applications of these post-petition pre-plan payments.
Some courts have required these payments to be applied to the principal of the undersecured creditor's debt. In that event, the unsecured portion of the secured creditor's claim
is paid first, and at confirmation the court determines the secured portion without regard
to these payments.
A secured creditor can sometimes improve its position by making additional post-petition loans to the debtor. The debtor can use unsecured credit in the ordinary course of
business, unless the court orders otherwise. 55 In the usual case the trade creditors are unsecured creditors and are unwilling to extend the debtor additional open account credit. To
obtain secured credit by granting post-petition security interests, the debtor must first obtain court approval .5 The secured creditor may be able to obtain adequate protection payments from the debtor or other concessions in exchange for the secured creditor extending
additional secured credit. All such arrangements must be presented to the bankruptcy
court after the required notice. 7
C. Filing Proofof Claim
If the debtor's schedules accurately list the secured creditor's claim, no proof of claim
need be filed. 5 8 If the creditor's claim is unlisted, incorrectly described, disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, the secured creditor must file a proof of claim. The secured creditor
would be wise to file a proof of claim in every case unless the creditor wants to avoid the

48. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988). The term "cram-down" is not used in the Code but was coined by the courts for the
procedure to impose a plan on non-consenting parties. These matters are beyond the scope of this article. See Klee,All YouEver
Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 133 (1979).
49. SeeIn re EFH Grove Tower Assocs., 105 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
50. 11U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
51. John Fabick Tractor Co. v. Maun (In re Maun), 95 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
52. II U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(B) (1988).
53. Travelers Ins. Co. v. American AG Credit Corp. (In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co.), 859 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1988);
BANKR. R. 4001.

54. See In re Kain, 86 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1988).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (1988).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1988).
58.28 U.S.C. § 111 l(a) (1988).
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bankruptcy court's "core proceeding" 59 jurisdiction. By filing its claim, the secured
creditor consents to this jurisdiction.
The claim must substantially conform to official form number 19. 60 The creditor
should attach copies of its promissory note, security documents, and proof of perfection.61
Although the form does not ask for collateral value, the secured creditor should make a
strategic decision to state a value which may be accepted. A filed proof of claim supersedes the scheduling of the claim by the debtor.62
D. Motionfor Relieffrom Stay Under Subsection 362(d) (2)
The secured creditor's first move is usually to file a motion for relief from the stay
(sometimes called "a motion to lift stay"). The motion normally includes a request that the
stay either be terminated or that the debtor provide the secured creditor with adequate protection. Subsection 362(d) contains two grounds for relief for the secured creditor: (1) "for
cause," and (2) "the debtor does not have an equity in such property;" and the "property is
not necessary to an effective reorganization."63 In a hearing on a motion for relief from the
stay, the secured creditor has "the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in
property," and the debtor has "the burden of proof on all other issues."64
Under the Timbers' opinion, after the secured creditor establishes that it is undersecured, the burden shifts to the debtor to prove that:
1. The collateral is essential to the debtor;
2. An effective reorganization is in prospect;
3. The reorganization has a reasonable possibility of success; and
65
4. The reorganization can be accomplished within a reasonable time.
Since Timbers, secured creditors have more often sought protection under subsection
362(d)(2). A number of decisions since Timbers have sustained the secured creditor's motion for relief from stay after finding that the debtor has no equity and that the collateral is
unnecessary for an effective reorganization. 66 Courts have granted relief to the secured
creditor during the debtor's four-month exclusive period.
Only three months after the petition filing, the bankruptcy court in In re DiplomatElectronics Corp.67 allowed a secured creditor relief from the stay so the creditor could foreclose its security interest in the debtor's accounts receivable and inventory. 68 The court
held that "[w]here the debtor has not shown that it can obtain confirmation of a plan, it has

59. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c) (1988).
60. BANKR. R. Form No. 19-Proof of Claim.
61. BANKR. R. 3001(d).

62. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988); BANKR. R. 3003(c)(4).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(l)-(2) (1988).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (1988).
65. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988).
66. In re PMS Assocs. No. 2, 104 Bankr. 86, 89 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) ("The Court concludes that the Debtors have failed
to present sufficient, credible evidence that there is a reasonable possibility of successful reorganization within a reasonable
time."); In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 Bankr. 140 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Halvorson, 102 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1989) (also a danger to the secured creditor because the collateral was moved to another state); In re Century Inv. Fund VII Ltd.
Partnership, 96 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989) (parties stipulated the value of the collateral to equal the amount of outstanding liens).
67. In re Diplomat Elecs. Corp., 82 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68. Id.
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not met its burden of showing that the property is necessary to an effective reorganization."69
The debtor can no longer defend these motions by arguing, without supporting evidence, that the collateral is necessary for an effective reorganization.7 ° In re Kurth
Ranch7 1 involved a Chapter 11 proceeding by a rancher whose lands were under liens to a
bank. 72 The bank moved for relief from the stay under subsection 362(d); the debtors and
their trustee objected on the grounds that the collateral was "essential to any reorganization" since the income produced from the lands was necessary to fund any plan of reorganization.7 a The bankruptcy court found that the secured creditor had proven the debtors held
no equity in the lands and stated:
The issue before the Court is thus whether the property is necessary for an effective reorganization. On this issue the Trustee and the Debtors argue that without the ranch property, no
reorganization is possible. Such argument begs the issue, however, and is premised on a failure of such parties to recognize that the property must not only be necessary for reorganization, but that reorganization is feasible under the Code. 7 . . . [N]o Plan has been proposed
by the Debtors or Trustee, nor did any Debtor or the Trustee testify at the hearing as to the
contents of any prospective Plan which could be confirmed by the Court. Both the Debtors
and the Trustee rested their case on an erroneous interpretation of § 362(d)(2), which is legally insufficient to satisfy § 362(g)(2). The Court is thus left with no alternative but to grant
the [secured creditor's] motion for relief from the stay since it cannot conclude
on the basis of
75
the present record that an effective Plan of Reorganization is in prospect.
In In re Hanley76 the court granted the motion for relief from the stay of a judgment
creditor with second and third liens against the Chapter 11 debtors' home.77 When the
debtors failed to offer evidence to meet their burden, the bankruptcy court found that the
debtors had no equity 78 and that the home was "not necessary to an effective reorganization." 79 The district court affirmed, noting the long delay since the petition filing and lack
of approval of a disclosure statement.
The debtor also failed in its burden of proof in In re L & MProperties,Inc. ,80 where the
secured creditor held a deed of trust covering ground leases upon which the debtor operated a motel. At the hearing the parties agreed that the debtor had no equity in the property. The debtor's officers did not testify, but the debtor introduced evidence from a

69. Id. at 693.
70. Timbers impliedly overruled a number of cases using a "necessity test" to judge the debtor's right to maintain the stay.
Under this standard, the debtor was not required to show a reasonable likelihood of a successful reorganization. The debtor only
had to show that no reorganization was possible with the property. See In re Rassier, 85 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988);
Hunter Say. Ass'n v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 74 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
71. In re Kurth Ranch, 97 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
72. ld.
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id. at 35.
75. Id. at 36.
76. 102 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
77. Id.
78. " 'Equity' for purposes of § 362(d)(2)(A) is the difference between the value of the property and the total of the claims it
secures." Id. at 37 (citing In re Diplomat Elecs. Corp., 82 Bankr. at 692; Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1984)).
79. Id. at 37.
80. General Motor Inns, Inc. v. L & M Properties, Inc. (In re L & M Properties), 102 Bankr 481 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
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witness with experience in workouts of other distressed motel properties. According to the
opinion, this witness "revealed, in the vaguest terms possible, that the debtor hoped to renovate the motel, improve its financial 'track record,' and thus find a purchaser or investor
willing to take on the business." 81 The court described the debtor's burden of proof as follows:
To successfully defend a request for relief under § 362(d)(2) a debtor must prove that a reasonable likelihood exists that an effective reorganization can be achieved within a reasonable period of time. . . . [Debtor's witness'] testimony before the Court concerning the debtor's plan
for reorganization amounted to nothing more than an expression of hope that a buyer or investor may be found . . . . The debtor presented no evidence of any attempts to find a buyer for
the business or to obtain new sources of capital . . . . Further, no credible income or profit
projection or quantitative financial forecast was introduced by the debtor. To determine that
there can be an effective reorganization of the debtor's business the debtor must persuade the
82
Court that the operation of the business will generate sufficient income to pay debt service.
Even when the debtor does offer substantial evidence, that proof must convince the
bankruptcy court that the reorganization is feasible. In In re NationalReal EstateLtd. Partnership 1183 the debtor introduced detailed evidence of its proposed plan of reorganization,
but the bankruptcy court found the debtor's plan could not work, stating: "Sincerity, honesty and willingness are not sufficient to make the plan feasible, and neither are any visionary promises. The test is whether the things which are to be done after confirmation can be
done as a practical matter under the facts."8'
85
In In re 8th Street Village Ltd. Partnership
the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's grant of relief to an undersecured creditor with a lien on the debtor's shopping center.8 6 The debtor-appellant argued that the bankruptcy court erred in rejecting the testimony of its witness when there was no opposing evidence.87 The district court held it was
for the bankruptcy court to determine whether the witness' testimony was credible and
based on sound reasoning, stating: "The bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in
finding that debtor failed to satisfy its burden of proving there was a reasonable possibility
of an effective plan. There being no feasible plan, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in lifting the stay."88

81. Id. at 483.
82. Id. at 484-85.
83. 87 Bankr. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
84. Id. at 993 (quoting In re Bergman, 585 F.2d 1171, 1179 (2d Cir. 1978)).
85. 94 Bankr. 993 (N.D. 11. 1988).

86. Id.
87. ld. at 996.
88. Id. at 998.
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Many Chapter 11 debtors89 have been successful in meeting the burden of proof required by Timbers and subsection 363(g).90 Debtors have also been successful in confirming plans over the objections of secured creditors relying on Timbers. 91
In In re Triton/RichmondAssociates Ltd. Partnership92 the bankruptcy court denied the
secured creditor's motion for relief under subsection 362(d)(2) on two multi-family residential rental properties.9 3 In holding that the debtor had met its proof burden, the court
stated:
The debtor is not required, however, to demonstrate that it has actually proposed a plan of
reorganization acceptable to its creditors. Rather, the debtor need show only that there is a
reasonable probability that it will be able to propose a plan that will result in a successful reorganization . . . . [T]he Court finds that the debtor provided credible, if not particularly detailed, evidence of its efforts to obtain additional financing for the apartment projects, and of
94
its plans to possibly convert the townhouse apartments to condominiums.

The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's termination of the stay in In re EastWest Associates.95 The secured creditor's motion was based upon alleged bad faith, subsections 362(d)(1) and (2) because there was no effective reorganization in prospect, as
the proposed plan could not be confirmed. 96 In addressing the subsection 362(d)(2) argument, the court stated: "The feasibility test does not require that the debtor show that its

reorganization plan is confirmable, i.e., acceptable to its creditors."97
Another district court98 stated the standard of proof as follows:
[T]he Court remands the motion with instructions that the [bankruptcy court] make explicit
findings as to whether an effective reorganization is in prospect. The court need not determine whether the reorganization plan is confirmable. It need only determine whether the
components of the plan which are to be done after confirmation can be accomplished as a
practical matter. In making such findings, the bankruptcy court should examine the reorganization plan in sufficient depth to assess its feasibility.

99

89. Chapter 13 wage earner plans are beyond the scope of this article. See Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Elmore (In re
Elmore), 94 Bankr. 670 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) for a Chapter 13 case discussing the applicability of imbers.
90. In re Executive House Assocs., 99 Bankr. 266 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Admiral's Gate Assocs., 106 Bankr. 20
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1989).
91. See Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989) (a
post-Timberscase involving asecured creditor's objection to the Chapter II plan in which the Fifth Circuit reversed the rulings of
the district and bankruptcy courts and held the secured creditor was receiving "indubitable equivalent of its secured claim" under
the plan); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the district court's granting debtor's motion for summary judgment on the secured creditor's
objections to the Chapter I I plan); se also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 878 F.2d 354 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (where secured creditor's objection to confirmation of Chapter 12 plan was overruled).
92. Crestar Bank v. Triton/Richmond Assocs. Ltd. Partnership (In re Triton/Richmond Assocs. Ltd. Partnership), 103
Bankr. 764 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
93. Id.
94. ld. at 767-68.
95. Carteret Sav. Bank v. Nastasi-White, Inc. (In re East-West Assocs.), 106 Bankr. 767, 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
96. Id. at 769.
97. Id. at 774 (citations omitted).
98. Travelers Life & Annuity Co. v. Ritz-Carlton of D.C., Inc. (In re Ritz-Carlton of D.C., Inc.), 98 Bankr. 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
99. Id. at 173.
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Timbers has, therefore, caused the bankruptcy courts to examine more closely debtors'
financial affairs and plans to see that they are feasible, realistic, and practical. In this regard Timbers has strengthened secured creditor's arguments on motions for relief from the
stay under subsection 362(d)(2).
E. Motion for Relieffrom Stay Under Subsection 362 (d)(1)
Under subsection 362(d)(1) on request of a secured creditor, the bankruptcy court may
terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay "for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest. "") Even though
Timbers held that the undersecured creditor with stable value collateral was not entitled to
adequate protection for loss of the right to foreclose, subsection 362(d)(1) allows a secured
creditor relief "for cause." As expressly recognized in Timbers, "cause" includes decline in
the collateral's value during the stay period.10 1 Thus, if the collateral is depreciating or is
being dissipated, the secured creditor is entitled to full relief for such loss of value.,o 2
The measure of relief is the decrease in value of the secured creditor's collateral occurring during the stay. For adequate protection purposes, a secured creditor's value is established as of the date of the petition for Chapter 11; that value is "entitled to adequate
protection against deterioration., 1 03 Hearings under subsection 362(d)(1) will require
proof of value and depreciation. Unless the secured creditor can show a declining value,
104
the motion shall be denied.
Timbers "does not eliminate actions [under subsection 362(d)(1)] for lack of adequate
insurance or adequate maintenance or for demonstrable depreciation or obsolescence in
the property. '11 5 Many other factual situations including movement of the collateral to another state, 10 6 commingling collateral, obsolescence, and poor maintenance can create a
"cause" entitling the secured creditor to relief from the stay.
If the debtor fails to keep the collateral properly insured, the bankruptcy court should
either lift the stay or prohibit the use of the property. 10 7 If a secured creditor pays for the
insurance coverage on the debtor's default, "[a] secured creditor is entitled to receive insurance costs as part of adequate protection. 108
Subsection 362(d)(1) continues to be an important avenue of redress for both the secured and the undersecured creditor. The "for cause" provision allows the bankruptcy
courts wide latitude to protect the secured creditor's property interest in the collateral being used by the debtor.

100. 11u.s.c. §

362(d)(1) (1988).

101. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 370 (1988).
102. 11U.S.C. § 361(2) (1988).
103. Travelers Life & Annuity Co. v. Ritz-Carlton of D.C., Inc. (In re Ritz-Carlton of D.C., Inc.), 98 Bankr. 170, 173
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
104. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Elmore (In re Elmore), 94 Bankr. 670 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
105. In re Lewis, 83 Bankr. 682, 683 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
106. In re Halvorson, 102 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
107. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Ryals (In re Ryals), 3 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
108. Carteret Sav. Bank v. Nastasi-White Inc. (In re East-West Assocs.), 106 Bankr. 767, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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F Secured Creditors'Objection to Debtor's Motionfor Use of
Cash Collateral
The Chapter 11 debtor may use its property in the ordinary course of business without
prior court approval. 1"9 However, cash collateral type property cannot be used until the
debtor first obtains the bankruptcy court's approval. 1 0
In the hypothetical, First Mortgage holds a perfected security interest in Apartments'
rents."' Since rent is cash collateral,112 Apartments must obtain court authority to use
rents in its debtor-in-possession operations. The bankruptcy court is authorized "based on
the equities of the case" to permit the debtor to use rents and other cash collateral.113 Some
bankruptcy courts have permitted use of rent to maintain and preserve the apartment col114
lateral.
In the customary situation the debtor needs the use of post-petition rents or accounts
receivable under a security interest to a secured creditor. The debtor files a motion for
leave to use cash collateral, usually identifying the adequate protection tendered the secured creditor for use of this collateral. The Code authorizes an expedited hearing on these
motions "in accordance with the needs of the debtor."115 The secured party is, of course,
given notice and an opportunity for hearing on the debtor's motion.
Since the debtor must provide the secured creditor with adequate protection for the use
of cash collateral,116 one standard debtor approach is to claim an equity cushion in other
collateral sufficient to protect the secured creditor's interests. In the case of an undersecured creditor there would be no equity cushion, and the debtor would have to propose
some other method of adequately protecting the undersecured creditor's interest in the
cash used.
The secured creditor's typical response to the debtor's motion is an objection, a demand
for adequate protection for the use of the cash collateral, and a cross-motion for relief from
the stay or to convert or dismiss the Chapter 11 proceeding. As of January, 1990, the only
Mississippi bankruptcy case opinion relying on Timbers involved the debtor's motion to
use cash collateral and the secured creditor's response by motion to convert to Chapter
7.117

In order to obtain relief, the secured party must, of course, hold a valid perfected secu11 8 the secured
rity interest in the cash collateral. In In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership
creditor filed a motion to prohibit use of certain funds and to sequester rents. 119 The court

109. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1988).
11I. The secured creditor must hold a perfected non-voidable security interest on the cash collateral. The prior equitable doctrine affording mortgagees an automatic security interest in rents and profits was rejected in Butler v. United States, 440 U.S. 48
(1979).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
113.11 U.S.C.§552(b)(1988).
114. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Pine Lake Village Apartment Co. (In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co.), 21 Bankr. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
115. 11 U.S.C. §363(c)(3) (1988).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
117. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. Neither Bankruptcy Judge David W. Houston of the Northern District of
Mississippi nor Bankruptcy Judge Edward Gaines of the Southern District of Mississippi has rendered an opinion involving Timbers during the two years after that decision.
118.99 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989).
119. Id.
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held that the secured creditor did not hold a properly perfected security interest in the rents
and was therefore not entitled to relief.12 The court noted that "[clash collateral is thus
generally payable only to the lender secured by the income producing property, and is not
1 21
available for equitable distribution among the general unsecured creditors of the debtor."
If the debtor uses cash collateral without court authority, the secured creditor should
and to
immediately file a motion to prohibit use of cash collateral, for relief from the stay,122
dismiss. The secured creditor can also move for sequestration of rents and profits.
G. Motion to Convert to Chapter 7 or to Dismiss
The bankruptcy court may convert the Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case
or may dismiss the Chapter 11 case "whichever is in the best interest of the creditors and
the estate." 123 Although a number of grounds exist for conversion or dismissal, secured
creditors most often use:
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by debtor that is prejudicial to the creditors; [and]
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by the
court .... 124

At the hearing to convert or dismiss, the secured creditor must prove that the debtor's
estate is suffering loss or diminution and that there is absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation. The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi recently
converted a Chapter 11 proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding only one month after the f'ling. 12' The debtor had filed an emergency motion for authority to use cash collateral and
pre-petition accounts receivable; the secured creditor had filed a motion to convert or dismiss. 126 The court relied upon the Timbers decision and subsection 11 12(b) to rule that:
[T]he debtor does not have a reasonable prospect for a successful reorganization and that any
potential benefit to creditors which might be derived by the use of cash collateral is outweighed by the risk. The motion to use cash collateral is denied, and the motion to convert to a
Chapter 7 is granted.1 27
A number of courts have used the debtor's "inability to effectuate a plan" as a basis for a
conversion or dismissal. 128 As stated in the Timbers decision, even within the four-month
exclusive period that the debtor has to file a plan, the court may grant relief when there is a

120. Id. at 11.
121.
ld. at8.
122. In re Erickson, 83 Bankr. 701 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
123. It U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988).
124. 11 U.S.C.§ 1121(b)(1)-(4) (1988).
125. In re Cook Constr. Co., No. 89-03488-JC, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Dec. 4, 1989).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 12.
128. In re CCN Realty Corp., 23 Bankr. 261,262 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (six months after filing of petition); In re Lamar
Estates, Inc.,
6 Bankr. 933, 934 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (seven months after filing of petition).
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"lack of any realistic prospect of effective reorganization."1 29 When a motion to convert or
dismiss is based upon "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors,"
benefit of the creditors as a whole, rather than just to the benefit of the
the courts look to the
0
moving creditor.13

When a debtor is unable to present a plan of confirmation within the four-month exclu1 31
Acsive period, the debtor usually requests the court to extend the exclusive period.
cording to the Code's legislative history, such extensions should be granted "on a showing
of some promise of probable success" to avoid use of extensions "as a tactical device to put
pressure on parties in interest to yield to a plan they consider unsatisfactory. 13 2
The secured creditor usually opposes the debtor's request for an extension of the exclusive period. The secured creditor and the unsecured creditors committee may wish to propose a plan of their own. "The debtor bears the burden of establishing 'cause' for an
extension of its exclusive period." 1 3 Where the case is complex with a number of creditors, large assets and liabilities, and difficult legal issues, the bankruptcy courts will usually grant the debtor some extension of the exclusive period.
The bankruptcy court can also convert to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding or dismiss
a Chapter 11 proceeding for "failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title
within any time fixed by the court." 34 Although this provision implies authority for the
bankruptcy court to fix a time for the proposing of a plan, the Code provides no such express power. Bankruptcy courts have relied on this implied authority to enter orders scheduling the time for the debtor to file plans.
When the debtor is guilty of a bad faith proceeding, the bankruptcy court can grant relief under the "for cause" provisions of subsection 362(d)(1) on relief from the stay or of
subsection 1112(b) on conversions and dismissals. 3 ' In reviewing the debtor's good faith,
bankruptcy courts look to see if the debtor has any assets, real debts, and real creditors, or
if the debtor is abusing the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 136 One court listed these
factors for consideration:
(1) the debtor has only one asset, the property; (2) the debtor has few unsecured creditors
whose claims are small inrelation to the claims of the secured creditors; (3) the debtor has few
employees; (4) the property is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of arrearages on
the debt; (5)the timing of the debtor's filing evidences an intent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of the debtor's secured creditors to enforce their rights.137
The bankruptcy courts must consider each case on its own facts when faced with a motion to dismiss for a bad-faith filing. The bankruptcy court in In re SarasotaPlazaAssoci-

129. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988). Tinbers impliedly
overruled the line of cases, such as In re Ault, 63 Bankr. 638 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1986), holding that an unreasonable delay cannot
occur during the debtor's four-month exclusive period to fide a plan of reorganization.
130. H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 405, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODECONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6361.
131. 11U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1988).
132. S.REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS5787, 5904.
133. In re Washington-St. Tammany Elec. Coop., Inc., 97 Bankr. 852, 854 (E.D. La. 1989).
134. 11U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4) (1988).
135. Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir.
1986).
136. In re Cardi Ventures, Inc., 59 Bankr. 18, 21-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
137. Carteret Sav. Bank v. Nastasi-White, Inc. (In re East-West Assocs., 106 Bankr. 767, 771-72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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ates Ltd. Partnership138 held:
There is still room for debtors with a single real estate asset in the bankruptcy court; first, to
receive protection in the bankruptcy court and, ultimately, to achieve rehabilitation under the
provisions of new Chapter 11. The ultimate test is still as it was under the pre-Code law: first,
whether there is a "real need" of reorganization and, second, the debtor demonstrates an ability to effectuate a reorganization without inordinate delay . . . . In sum, when a Chapter 11
case of a debtor with one single asset which is sought to be dismissed for "bad faith" the court
must consider all circumstances surrounding the case and none of the traditionally recognized
139
elements of "bad faith" are controlling.
Absent these elements of bad faith and some abusive tactics by the debtor, such as repeated filings and dismissals, the secured creditor has a difficult burden to meet. Motions
for bad faith should be used by a secured creditor only when the circumstances demand its
application by the court.
H. Motion to Shorten Time for Debtor to File Plan
Relying on the inferential power of subsection 111 2(b)(4), the moving creditor has the
burden of showing "cause" for such shortening of time. The creditor filing such motion
would ordinarily join it with a motion for relief from the stay.
L Motion for Valuation of Security
The secured creditor may move the bankruptcy court to determine the value of its collateral. According to one authority, the secured creditor should seek the highest possible
value.140 This is especially important when the secured party's collateral value only marginally exceeds the amount of the debt. The higher the value, the larger the secured claim
held by the secured creditor.
The valuation of a secured creditor's collateral is important in many different contexts:
to determine the issue of adequate protection under section 361, impairment of the claim
under section 1124, or treatment of the claim in a plan pursuant to subsection 1129(b) of
the Code. Since an evaluation under subsection 506(a) ("determination of secured status")
is based on a different standard from a claim evaluation for the plan of confirmation, a secured creditor could receive two differing evaluations of its collateral at different times in
the Chapter 11 proceeding.
J. Motionfor Appointment of Examiner or Trustee
The bankruptcy court may appoint "an examiner to conduct such investigation of the
debtor as is appropriate, including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor."1 41 A successful
motion by a secured party for an examiner shifts the cost of the examiner to the estate, so
that the secured party does not incur additional expenses for its own investigating accountants.
If the court believes that cause exists-such as fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or
gross mismanagement of the debtor by current management -the court may also appoint a

138. In re Sarasota Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 102 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).

139. Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
140. L. LoPUCKI, supra note 6, at 483.

141.11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988).
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trustee to take charge of the debtor's affairs. While the trustee may operate the debtor's
business, the trustee usually seeks to sell the business or liquidate its assets as soon as possible. A trustee is more likely to abandon property to a secured creditor than is a debtor in
possession who is operating the business. The secured creditor should not seek a trustee
when it has received voidable payments or property from the debtor. The trustee has a
duty to investigate transactions between the debtor and the secured party to find voidable
preferential transfers, fraudulent conveyances, and unperfected liens.
K. Objection to Disclosure Statement and to Confirmation
The confirmation process involves two separate hearings: first, the approval of the disclosure statement, and second, the confirmation hearing. The disclosure statement is required to provide "adequate information," meaning information of a kind and in sufficient
detail to enable a reasonable investor typical of the holders of claims or interests to make an
informed judgment about the plan. 142 A secured creditor can object to the adequacy of the
information provided in the debtor's proposed disclosure statement. "The court may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an appraisal of the debtor's
assets."' 43 Objections to the disclosure statement are usually more matters of form than
substance.
Confirmation of a plan of reorganization is a difficult task, as the plan can be confirmed
"only if all" of numerous requirements are met.1'4 The debtor must provide the secured
creditor with deferred cash payments equal to the present value of the collateral (i.e., the
allowed secured claim) or its "indubitable equivalent. ' 145 In addition, the plan must "not
discriminate unfairly" and must be "fair and equitable" for each non-accepting class or interest impaired.'4
The secured creditor has a right to vote against the plan and can file an objection to confirmation. 147 Unless the debtor can fulfill the stringent requirements for a "cram-down,"
the secured party's objection effectively kills the plan.
V. STRATEGIES FOR THE OVERSECURED CREDITOR

A. General
The secured creditor holding a lien against collateral worth more than the debt ("oversecured creditor") continues to accrue as part of the secured debt interest on the claim and
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges under the agreement between the parties. 148 If the
oversecured creditor is not concerned about dissipation or depreciation of the collateral, it
can simply do nothing and wait for the debtor's proposal of a plan of reorganization. If
concerned about decreasing collateral value, the oversecured creditor should either request adequate protection from the debtor or file a motion for relief from the stay, to condition use of the property, or for adequate protection.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(1)-(A)(iii) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
BANKR. R. 3018, 3020(b)(1).
11U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
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B. Equity Cushion Adequate Protection
Many courts have used an "equity cushion" theory to provide the oversecured creditor
the adequate protection required by the Code. Equity cushion means "value in the property above the amount owed to the creditor with a secured claim, that will shield [the creditor's] interest from loss due to any decrease in the value of the property during the time the
automatic stay remains in effect." 149 In re WRB WestAssociates Joint Venture 5 ° is a typical
case. The debtor was allowed use of cash collateral with the creditor's adequate protection
coming from a "substantial equity cushion of 40% .,"5
Some cases have discussed "ownership of the equity cushion." For example, In re
McCombs Properties VI Ltd.1 5 2 the Chapter 11 debtor moved for authority to use cash collateral (rents of an apartment project) to pay operating expenses and to protect the property
from deterioration. The court granted the debtor's motion based on an equity cushion providing adequate protection to the secured creditor and made several important rulings:
[A]dequate protection under § 363 should be treated the same as under § 362 .... A secured
creditor has no right to the equity cushion in its collateral. It only has a right to look to the
collateral for payment of its claim "upon completion of the reorganization. It is then that he
must be assured 'realization . . . of the indubitable equivalent' of his collateral. "[Citing Tim-

bers] The unsecured creditors and the debtor have rights to the cushion. Section 506(a) reinforces this view by limiting the secured status of a creditor to the lesser of the claim or the
value of the collateral. Furthermore, § 506(b) requires any payment of interest on a secured
creditor's claim during the bankruptcy to be taken from the cushion. . . . For these reasons, I
cushion for adequate protection.
reject any inference that Timbers limits the use of an equity
3
To the contrary, by implication it supports such use. 15
If the secured creditor is to recover all its principal, interest, fees, and other costs, the
collateral value must cover the total expected debt. After the equity cushion is used, the
secured creditor's right to interest and fees ends. Since cash collateral is easily and quickly
dissipated, the secured creditor must be alert to unauthorized use by a debtor and seek
prompt relief from the bankruptcy court. In defending the debtor's motion, the secured
creditor should present valuation evidence to rebut the debtor's use of equity cushion for
adequate protection.
VI. CONCLUSION

The vast majority of Chapter 11 proceedings fail. Too often a debtor files a petition for
the sole purpose of stopping a foreclosure or suit. Too many petitioners have no long-term
resolutions for their financial problems. In the past these proceedings have often taken
years before a conversion or dismissal has been ordered. The secured creditors, especially
those with little or no equity cushion, are harmed by these delays in realizing upon the
value of their collateral.

149.
150.
151.
152.

La Jolia Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 Bankr. 283,287 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
106 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
Id. at 220.
McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 Bankr. 261 (Bankr. C.D.

Cal. 1988).
153. Id. at 266-67.
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Under Timbers the bankruptcy courts across the nation are now more closely scrutinizing the debtor's realistic prospects of a successful reorganization. Those proceedings with
a true prospect of reorganization will be permitted to proceed in accord with the design of
the Code. Those filed merely to delay the creditor or to stop a foreclosure will be converted
or dismissed earlier. The United States Supreme Court has, by the Timbers opinion, reestablished the delicate balance Congress intended between the good faith debtor's right to
seek a rehabilitative reorganization and the secured creditor's constitutional rights in its
collateral. In the long view the secured creditors, particularly the undersecured creditors,
will benefit from the Timbers decision.

